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Abstract: The federal movement in the Balkans is especially interesting, not because 
it was an ideological trend based on distinctive local characteristics, but precisely 
because it emerged concurrently with similar political and ideological trends on the 
rest of the continent, thus reflecting the close connection and mutual dependence 
between the various regions of Europe. The article approaches the different attempts 
for Balkan cooperation between the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning 
of the Cold War in reference to the corresponding movements for the European rec-
onciliation and unification, using comparatively the relevant bibliography.
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Introduction
Balkan federalism is, without a doubt, one of the most unfairly dealt with questions in modern European history. Very few studies have addressed 
it, and those that have treated it as a peripheral issue, making no attempt at 
a comprehensive presentation or a theoretical analysis. Tellingly, the most 
complete and comprehensive monograph on the subject, Stavrianos’s Bal-
kan Federation, was written in the 1940s and has been the main point of 
reference for subsequent studies that have examined its specific aspects.1 
1 L. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in 
Modern Times (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964). Stavrianos was preceded in the 
1930s by Robert Joseph Kerner and Harry Nicholas Howard, The Balkan Conferences 
and the Balkan Entente, 1930–1935: A Study in the Recent History of the Balkan and Near 
Eastern Peoples (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1936), which mainly discusses 
the contemporary federal movement in the region. The later studies also covered only 
some aspects of the question. See, e.g., D. Djordjević, “Projects for the Federation of 
South-East Europe in the 1860s and 1870s”, Balcanica I (1970), 119–145; A. J. Panayo-
topoulos, “The ‘Great Idea’ and the Vision of Eastern Federation: A propos of the Views 
of I. Dragoumis and A. Souliotis-Nicolaidis”, Balkan Studies XXI/2 (1980), 331–365; 
A. Liakos, H ιταλική ενοποίηση και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα [Italian unification and the Great 
Idea] (Athens 1985); V. Todorov, Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (New 
York 1995); A. Tounda-Fergadi, Mειονότητες στα Bαλκάνια. Bαλκανικές διασκέψεις, 
1930–1934 [Minorities in the Balkans: Balkan conferences, 1930–34] (Thessaloniki 
1994); L. Hassiotis, «Η� �νατολική ��οσπονδία��� δ�ο ελληνικές �εντε�αλιστικές κινήσεις       
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The lack of interest may be partially due to the fact that the relevant sources 
are both inadequate and scattered; but it has mainly to do with ideological 
factors: the fact that the subject has been ignored by Balkan national his-
toriographies, which have tended to focus on developments in individual 
countries, and the final renunciation of the ideal of Balkan unification 
in the 1940s. In contrast, the study of European federalism developed 
more after the Second World War, presumably spurred by the momentum 
created by the birth of the European Economic Community and its sub-
sequent development into today’s European Union.2 On the other hand, 
the very concept of Balkan unity is probably a contradiction in terms as 
regards the prevailing perception of the region, which sees its peoples as 
beyond the pale of European civilization, perpetually spoiling for a pitiless 
internecine fight.3 
The federal movement in the Balkans is especially interesting, not 
because it was an ideological trend based on distinctive local characteristics, 
which is highly questionable; but precisely because it emerged concurrently 
with similar political and ideological trends in the rest of the continent, 
thus reflecting the close connection and mutual dependence between vari-
ous regions of Europe.
του 19ου αιώνα [“The Eastern Federation”: two Greek federal movements of the nine-
teenth century] (Thessaloniki 2001).   
2 The literature on European federalism is inexhaustible. See, e.g., Geoffrey Barraclough, 
European Unity in Thought and Action (Oxford 1963); J. B. Duroselle, L’Idée d’Europe 
dans l ’histoire (Paris 1965); W. Lipgens, A History of European Integration, 1945–1947: 
The Formation of the European Unity Movement (Oxford 1982); M. L. Smith and Peter 
M. R. Stirk, Making the New Europe: European Unity and the Second World War (London 
and New York 1990); Alexander Tchoubarian, The European Idea in History in the Nine-
teenth and Twentieth Centuries: A View from Moscow (Essex 1994); J. Maritain, L‘Europe 
et l‘idée fédérale (Paris 1993); R. Bideleux and R. Taylor, eds., European Integration and 
Disintegration: East and West (London and New York 1996); P. M. R. Stirk, A History 
of European Integration since 1914 (London and New York 1996); David McKay, Fed-
eralism and the European Union: A Political Economy Perspective (Oxford and New York 
1999); Giorgos Kokkinos, �ναζητώντας την Ευ�ώπη. �ι αντινο�ίες της ευ�ωπαϊκής 
πολιτικής κουλτο��ας και η ιδέα της ευ�ωπαϊκής ενοποίησης [In search of Europe: The 
contradictions of European political culture and the idea of European unification] 
(Athens 2000); I. K. Hassiotis, �ναζητώντας την ενότητα στην πολυ�ο��ία. �ι απα�χές 
της Ευ�ωπαϊκής ενότητας από το τέλος του �εσαίωνα ως τη Γαλλική Επανάσταση [Seek-
ing unity in diversity: The beginnings of European unity from the end of the Middle 
Ages to the French Revolution] (Thessaloniki 2000); Anthony Pagden, ed., The Idea of 
Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union (New York and Cambridge 2002).
3 For the West’s traditional approach to the Balkans, see M. Todorova, Imagining the 
Balkans (New York 1997).
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The French Revolution and Balkan radicalism
During most of the eighteenth century, the dreams of the south-east Euro-
pean Christians (or at least of their intellectual elites) about political eman-
cipation from Ottoman rule were based on their liberation by an enlight-
ened despot, such as the Habsburg Joseph II or Catherine the Great of 
Russia. This hope was not necessarily a local characteristic: it followed the 
conviction of European Enlightenment figures, such as Voltaire, who based 
their hopes for the modernisation of their nations and of Europe as a whole 
on enlightened absolute monarchy. As in the rest of Europe, so too in the 
Balkans it was the French Revolution that radicalised the thinking and the 
activity of the intelligentsia, because it showed that political emancipation 
could result from the action of the people themselves. The Declaration of 
Human Rights, the revolutionary constitutions of 1791 and 1793, and the 
ideological and political ferment in revolutionary France, were a source of 
inspiration for the rising bourgeoisies of south-eastern Europe, who sought 
to break away from the Ottoman and, secondarily, the Habsburg regime. 
Napoleon’s occupation of the Ionian Islands and the Dalmatian coast in 
1809 had immediate and long-lasting effects on the development of intel-
lectual life and political thought in the Balkans, and also on the emergence 
of local national and social radical movements.4
Possibly the supreme exponent of Balkan radicalism, during its early 
phase at least — i.e. until the Congress of Vienna (1814) — was Rigas 
Velestinlis (or Pheraios). He was active in the last decade of the eighteenth 
century, with Vienna as his base and within a wider circle of Balkan revo-
lutionaries, publishing in Greek a number of works that conveyed to his 
readers the revolutionary fervour and the expectations that the French Rev-
olution had spawned all over Europe. Rigas’s proclamation for a unified 
political organisation of the Balkans was the first such proposal to come 
from within the peninsula and was more comprehensively elucidated in the 
most political of his works, the New political administration of the inhabitants 
of Roumeli, Asia Minor, the Mediterranean islands, and Wallachia-Moldavia.5
Rigas called upon the peoples of the Ottoman Empire to rise up 
together to overthrow the sultan’s regime and to found in its place a “Hel-
lenic Republic”, which would be “unified and indivisible”: Greek would be 
4 P. Kitromilides, “The Enlightenment East and West: A comparative perspective on 
the ideological origins of the Balkan political traditions”, Enlightenment, Nationalism, 
Orthodoxy, I (Aldershot and Brookfield: Ashgate’s Variorum, 1994), 60–63. 
5 P. Kitromilides, “Republican aspirations in south-eastern Europe in the age of 
the French Revolution”, Enlightenment, V, 275–282; P. Kitromilides, Νεοελληνικός 
Δια�ωτισ�ός. �ι πολιτικές και κοινωνικές ιδέες [Modern Greek Enlightenment: The 
political and social ideas] (Athens 1996), 316.
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its official language, and all its subjects would be recognised as equal citi-
zens regardless of their religion or racial origin. The posterity has looked at 
the proposal with considerable scepticism, mainly as regards the new state’s 
national orientation as reflected in its title and the choice of Greek as the 
official language. Was this in fact a reflection of budding Greek nationalism 
intent on establishing a Greek state over the entire territory of the Euro-
pean Ottoman Empire and much of Anatolia? Or was it a sincere proposal 
seeking to unify the Balkan peoples? At all events it would be pointless to 
judge Rigas on the basis of later patterns of thought, i.e. outside the tradi-
tion of the Enlightenment and the perception of the nation introduced by 
the French Revolution.6 
Rigas’s declaration was clearly influenced by the Jacobin model of 
state organisation and national identity. In the Charter of Human Rights 
Rigas faithfully followed the French declaration that preceded the French 
constitution of 1793; the choice of the more radical constitution of the 
French Revolution, which was to become the model for the die-hard French 
and European republicans, was no accident: it accurately reflected the pref-
erence of the Balkan radicalism of the time for a democratic system of gov-
ernance, universal suffrage, and social cohesion over the more conservative 
demands subsequently adopted by European liberalism. The rationale of the 
federation was rejected or ignored either on the grounds of Jacobin cen-
tralisation, which looked at federal structures with suspicion as remnants of 
feudalism that helped perpetuate aristocratic power, or on the grounds that 
it corresponded with the ailing central Ottoman authority. The citizens of 
the “Hellenic Republic” could be Christians, Moslems, or Jews, of Greek, 
Slavonic, Turkish, or any other origin, but the sovereign people would be 
one and indivisible and the political institutions would have to underscore 
this unity. The diversity of the collective identity was thus recognised as one 
of the dimensions of the new state. True to the rationalism and Enlighten-
ment of his age, Rigas regarded distinctions based on language, religion, or 
racial origin as artificial, asserting that it was possible for different ethnic 
groups to coexist as long as all citizens were recognised as equal regardless 
of their specific collective identities. This perception obviously could not 
stand up to the contradictions that emerged out of the developing national 
question, but at the time it was articulated the romantic concept of the 
nation had not yet been formulated, nor had Greek national identity been 
6 For the influence of the French Revolution on Rigas’s constitution, see Maria López 
Villalba, “Balkanizing the French Revolution: Rhigas’s New Political Constitution”, in 
D. Tziovas, ed., Greece and the Balkans (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashagte, 2003), 
141–154. For the proposed “Hellenic republic”, see M. Mazower, The Balkans (London 
2000), 72–73.
L. Hassiotis, The Ideal of Balkan Unity from a European Perspective 213
fully clarified, nor were the national rivalries that subsequently character-
ised European political life yet taken for granted.
Rigas’s initiative and the other Jacobin-type movements in the 
Habsburg Empire were vigorously and harshly persecuted by the Austrian 
police. The suppression of the radical movements by the police forces of 
the ancien régime, which after Napoleon’s defeat and the establishment of 
the Holy Alliance seemed to be reaffirming its established position on the 
continent, meant that the only outlet for active opposition was the “con-
spiratorialism” of secret societies. The best-known conspiratorial organisa-
tion in south-eastern Europe at the time was Filiki Etairia (Friendly Soci-
ety), established in Odessa in 1814. The new circumstances in Europe also 
changed the organisation’s priorities compared to those of Rigas and his 
sympathisers. Whereas for Rigas the liberation of the subjugated peoples 
of the Ottoman Empire was inseparably linked with the prospect of po-
litical and social change, for Filiki Etairia a prerequisite of social reform 
was national independence. All the same, the notion of Balkan unity was 
embodied within the plans of Filiki Etairia’s members and collaborators: 
in the “General Plan”, which Filiki Etairia unsuccessfully promoted mainly 
to the Serbian leaders Karageorge Petrović and Miloš Obrenović with the 
aim of a Pan-Balkan uprising against the sultan; in the Russian Decem-
brist Pavel Pestel’s “Greek Plan” for a Hellenic federation patterned after 
the American model; and, later — after unsuccessful attempts to foment a 
general uprising of the Balkan peoples — in Ioannis Kapodistrias’s plan to 
create a confederation of Christian principalities in south-eastern Europe, 
headed by princes from various European royal houses and with its centre 
at Constantinople.7 
During the first wave of insurrections in south-eastern Europe im-
mediately after the Treaty of Vienna, the proposals for some kind of com-
mon political organisation of the Ottoman Empire’s European territories 
bore no fruit, either because they were unrealistic or because they had limit-
ed support either from the local rebels or from the great powers. The Greek 
War of Independence failed to spread over the entire peninsula and was 
eventually confined to its southern tip, where the Hellenic kingdom was 
formed in 1830 with clear national characteristics. The Serbian uprisings 
(1804–15) that led to the creation of an autonomous Serbian principality 
met the same fate. The new states (like those that were to be formed in the 
next few decades of the nineteenth century, namely Montenegro, Romania, 
7 Todorov, Greek Federalism, 1–22; P. Kitromilides, Η� γαλλική Επανάσταση και η 
Νοτιοανατολική Ευ�ώπη [The French Revolution and south-eastern Europe] (Athens 
2000), 160–169. 
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and Bulgaria) were shaped on the nation-state model. Their governments 
and rulers never seriously considered the arguments for unification or for 
forming a confederation except at times of crisis and usually out of sheer 
opportunism. Throughout the century the policy of the Balkan nation-states 
was based on the rationale of expansionism and of unifying all their co-re-
ligionists and ethnic kinfolk under their aegis. 
”The East by and for the East”: Federalisation as a solution to the national 
rehabilitation of the peoples of south-eastern Europe
The existence of the two old multi-ethnic — Habsburg and Ottoman — 
empires in south-eastern Europe and the Concert of Europe’s support for 
their integrity in the nineteenth century influenced the character of the fed-
eral movements in the region. Thus local federalism developed as a variant 
of the subject nations’ struggle for national rehabilitation: after the birth of 
the Hellenic kingdom irredentist organisations in Athens continued to base 
their plans on a general uprising of the Christians of the Ottoman Empire 
and to seek collaboration with Bulgarian, Serbian, and Albanian revolution-
aries. Similar initiatives were under way in the Danubian principalities and 
in Belgrade, with Balkan-wide participation. The slogan “The East by and 
for the East”, which was adopted by various political and intellectual groups 
in Greece in the 1860s as a paraphrase of the Risorgimento slogan “Italia 
farà da se”, like its variants in other Balkan countries, reflected a belief in the 
political and cultural self-reliance of the Orthodox East, a critical attitude 
towards the great powers, recognition of the national rights of all the Bal-
kan peoples, and an inclination towards some kind of confederation among 
them. It did not, however, reflect any kind of unified approach, nor did its 
use necessarily signify espousal of all these principles. It frequently veiled 
purely national aspirations with the aim of winning over allies among the 
neighbouring peoples, without at the same time precluding notions of intel-
lectual supremacy, political hegemony, or leadership. For many of its Greek 
users, the slogan meant that the Greeks would acculturate the East, which 
would unite under their hegemony in order to free itself from Ottoman 
authoritarianism, follow in the footsteps of the west-European nations, and 
become a force to be reckoned with, capable of standing up to the pressures 
of the great powers.8 For Ilija Garašanin, the Serbian official and architect 
8 See Liakos,  H ιταλική ενοποίηση, 126–128; E. Skopetea,   Το «πρότυπο βασίλειο» και η 
Μεγάλη Ιδέα. Όψεις� του ε�νικο�� προβλ��ατος� στην Ελλάδα      (1830–1880) [The “First 
Kingdom” and the Great Idea: Aspects of the National Problem in Greece, 1830–80] 
(Athens 1988), 340–342; Hassiotis, «�� �νατολικ� ��οσπονδία»  , 18–19.
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of the Serbian Načertanje irredentist plan, it meant the expansion of Serbia 
through a Balkan or south Slavonic alliance centring on Belgrade.9 
The association of nationalism and federalism was clearly influenced 
by the struggle for Italian unification, and specifically by Giuseppe Mazzini, 
who was actively involved in the plans for the federal reform of south-east-
ern Europe by way of his European revolutionary activities. Mazzini’s ideas 
were a mixture of Jacobin liberalism, religious sentiment, and universality; 
they were characterised by the contradictions of the early – liberal – period 
of nationalism: the linking of the principle of nationality and the solidarity 
of peoples did not address the destructive effects of aggressive nationalism. 
Although he himself disputed conservative theories about the “natural or-
der”, his views included a strong dose of organic convictions, as is apparent, 
for instance, in his plan for the territorial reorganisation of Europe, which 
involved the creation of fourteen national groups divided according to his-
tory, tradition, geography, and language.10
According to the same theory, a prerequisite for the accomplishment 
of the south-European nations’ mission was the collapse of the Habsburg 
and Ottoman empires. The local nations would subsequently form two con-
federations, the Danubian and the Helleno-Slavonic. Mazzini initially es-
poused the view that Greece had an acculturating role to play in the East, 
placing it at the head of a federation extending from Albania to Cilicia 
and Cyprus, and with Constantinople as its capital. Later on, discouraged 
by the limited capabilities of the Greek state and by its reluctance to coop-
erate with its neighbours, he upheld more balanced plans, though always 
inclining towards the creation of a local confederation, built according to 
democratic principles on the ruins of the multiethnic empires that would 
act as a barrier to Russian expansionism. Mazzini’s political views and his 
geopolitical proposals continued to influence democrats and federalists in 
the Balkans in the decades that followed, for the question arose every time 
the Eastern Question flared up.11 
One of the best-known federalist organisations in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, the Democratic Eastern Federation, which was 
founded in 1865 and had members and associates in Athens, Belgrade, Bu-
charest, Sofia, and Constantinople, was considerably influenced by Mazzini’s 
political theory: it was strongly antimonarchist, upheld solidarity among the 
peoples of the peninsula in their struggle for national liberation, and worked 
towards their organisation as a federation based on equality. Some mem-
9 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 51, 52.
10 A. C. d’Appollonia, “European Nationalism and European Union”, in Pagden, ed., 
Idea of Europe, 181–183; Duroselle, L’Idée d’Europe, 215–217.
11 Hassiotis, «Η� �νατολική ��οσπονδία�, 14–16.
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bers, like Andreas Rigopoulos, had sat on the European Democratic Cen-
tral Committee founded by Mazzini in 1850. The head of the organisation 
in Athens, Panayotis Panas, was one of the most prominent figures in the 
Greek radical republican movement in the nineteenth century. Panas be-
lieved that the unity of the Balkan peoples could be achieved only by chang-
ing the local regimes and the nationalist policies they were following, and 
he was also very critical of the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which 
he held responsible for the Slavs’ hostility towards the Greeks. During the 
Eastern Crisis of 1875–8 the Democratic Eastern Federation supported the 
joint rising of all the Balkan peoples against the Ottomans, though to no 
avail. In the end, this, like other federalist initiatives that appeared later on, 
was short-lived and had no decisive effect on inter-Balkan relations.12
The notion of the Danubian federation consistently featured in the 
geopolitical plans for central and eastern Europe for about a century — from 
the time of the rebellions of 1848 to just after Germany’s defeat in the Sec-
ond World War. It was based on the need to replace the Habsburg Empire 
with some other form of state construct that would satisfy the Habsburgs’ 
disaffected subjects and at the same time maintain stability and the balance 
of power in the region. 
The idea first appeared at the time of the Hungarian uprising of 
1848–9, but the Magyar nationalists refused to discuss the possibility of 
a federal Hungary, thus attracting the hostility of the other local ethnic 
groups, who did not want to see the Habsburg administration replaced 
by the government of a centralised Hungarian nation-state. Later on, the 
leader of the rebellion, Louis Kossuth realised that the Hungarian national 
goals could not be attained without the support of the other nationalities in 
the region, and he therefore accepted the solution of the Danubian federa-
tion, which could include Hungary, Serbia, and Romania. The plan was kept 
alive in the years that followed by many of the most prominent political 
figures of the nations concerned, and was encouraged throughout this pe-
riod by Mazzini, or by the prime minister of Piedmont, Camillo di Cavour, 
who were prepared to take part in any movement aimed at destabilising the 
Austrian Empire. Kossuth’s proposal echoed the desires of the liberal lead-
ers of the Danubian countries, who were anxious to introduce a constitu-
tional monarchy. But it held very little appeal for the local peasantry, whose 
social problems were of little concern to the national leaders negotiating 
the formation of the Danubian federation. Furthermore, the local national 
movements did not proved receptive to the possibility of the federation un-
til the prospect of separate national emancipation had receded. This latter 
12 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 150; Todorov, Greek Federalism, 83–139; Hassiotis, «Η� 
�νατολική ��οσπονδία�, 21ff.
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observation relates especially to the Magyar nationalists, who proved very 
reluctant to make any concessions to other nationalities and who eventu-
ally rejected the idea of the Danubian federation when the circumstances 
arising out of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 enabled them to achieve 
their basic demands, reaching a compromise with the Habsburg Monarchy 
through the Ausgleich of 1867.13 
The early Balkan socialists and their federal proposals
In south-eastern Europe the socialist movements emerged in the 1860s and 
1870s, influenced by the republican revolutionary tradition, Saint-Simo-
nism, anarchism, and the Russian narodniks, while Marxism began to gain 
ground at the end of the century. In each case they were movements that 
were active on the fringes of political life, with no major influence on so-
ciety, apart from some purely local phenomena, which, however, came to 
nothing. 
One of the first socialists to support the issue of the Balkan federa-
tion was the Serb Svetozar Marković, who attended the meetings of the 
League of Peace and Freedom that was founded in Switzerland in 1867. 
At the League’s conference in 1869, when the Eastern Question was also 
discussed, Marković supported the creation of a Federal Republic of Free 
Nations of south-eastern Europe. Though Marković and his comrades were 
not anarchists, they were influenced by Bakunin’s ideas about a free Europe 
that would be a confederation of free communities. He was more strongly 
influenced by the Russian narodnik Nikolai Chernyshevsky, who asserted 
that his country could attain socialism without first passing through capi-
talism, by means of the confederal organisation of the traditional Russian 
peasant community, the obshchina. Marković similarly believed that the new 
society should rest upon the democratic and patriarchal character of the vil-
lage, the union of the communities, and organised cooperative production. 
His theory was modelled on the traditional south Slavonic community, the 
zadruga, which was to constitute the nucleus of the political reshaping of 
Serbia and the entire peninsula; the Balkan federation would consist of such 
communities bound together in a confederation.14 The Bulgarian socialist 
Khristo Botev’s theories went in a similar direction. While in exile in Rus-
sia, he had met Russian nihilists and narodniks, and believed that Bulgaria 
13 The best source for the Danubian federation is Toward a New Central Europe: A Sym-
posium on the Problems of the Danubian Nations, ed. F. S. Wagner (Astor Park, Florida 
1970). Cf. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 66–81.
14 W. D. McClellan, Svetozar Marković and the Origins of Balkan Socialism (Princeton 
1964), 103, 122, 184–186.
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could win independence from the Ottoman Empire only through a peasant 
rebellion that would also target the Bulgarian notables. He also supported 
the idea of the Balkan federation, which he thought ought to be the result 
of a social revolution of the Balkan peoples, not of negotiations between 
governments.15
Another source of federalist proposals for the Balkans was social-
ist exiles and émigrés in western and central Europe who were active in 
the interconnected left-wing and pacifist circles there, such as the Soci-
ety of Friends of Peace, the International Peace Conference, the Comité des 
Orientalistes, and the League of Peace and Freedom. They included Pavlos 
Argyriades, a Greek from Macedonia who had settled in Paris shortly after 
the suppression of the Commune in 1871. Argyriades became a prominent 
figure in the French socialist movement. He supported the idea of Balkan 
unity both in the pages of his newspapers La Question Sociale and Almanach 
de la Question Sociale (et de la Libre Pensée) and through the League for the 
Balkan Federation, in the founding of which he had played a leading part in 
1894. The League’s ideological characteristics are fairly hazy, but there was 
a distinct tendency to link demands for political and economic emancipa-
tion with the demand for self-determination, as well as a strong criticism of 
the policy of the local governments and the European powers. Argyriades 
thought that the biggest obstacle to the confederation — apart from Ot-
toman domination, which anyway would soon collapse — was the conflict 
over the Macedonian Question, which had already divided the new na-
tion-states and the peoples of the region. In his view, the problem could be 
resolved by creating an autonomous Albano-Macedonian state within the 
confederation. This was an alternative proposal to the demands for Mace-
donian autonomy supported by many, mainly Bulgarian, federalists — de-
mands which, however, met with little response in Serbia and in Greece, 
due to the fear that the Slav majority in the province would one day lead to 
its being incorporated into Bulgaria.16 
These initiatives, needless to say, remained peripheral, although they 
did create a tradition which was subsequently followed by the more organ-
ised socialist movements of south-eastern Europe that appeared in the last 
decade of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth century, usually 
in the form of social democratic parties that shared the ideology of the Sec-
ond International. The more important of these were the social democratic 
15 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 115–119; A. Živković and D. Plavšić, eds., The Balkan 
Socialist Tradition: Balkan Socialism and the Balkan Federation, 1871–1915, vol. 8 no. 3 of 
Revolutionary Review (2003), 13–18.
16 P. Argyriades and P. Lagarde, Solution de la question d’Orient. La Confédération balka-
nique et la Macédoine (Paris 1896), 1–15. Cf. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 151.
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parties of Bulgaria (1891), of Serbia (1903), and of Romania (1906), and the 
Socialist Workers’ Federation (better known as the Federación) of the still 
Ottoman Thessaloniki, which was dominated by the city’s Jewish element. 
These parties included the idea of the federal organisation of the Balkans in 
their manifestos and consistently opposed the nationalist policies of their 
states, as well as the intervention of the great powers in the region. How-
ever, their views on the national question in the Balkans diverged, probably 
reflecting the more general contradictions inherent in the International’s 
position on the problem of nationalities. In particular, the Austrian Marx-
ists’ proposal for national autonomy within the framework of multiethnic 
states — which related to the ethnic problems of the Habsburg Empire and 
had a rather pro-German and anti-Russian stance — was ill-received by the 
Serbian and Bulgarian social democrats, who supported the dissolution of 
the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and the reorganisation of the 
region into a federal republic, but approved of by the Romanian social dem-
ocrats, who harboured similar fears as the like-minded Germans regarding 
the threat posed by Russian absolutism to the freedoms of the peoples of 
south-eastern Europe. All the same, these differences did not prevent the 
organisation of pan-Balkan socialist congresses (in 1910, 1911, and 1912), 
at which the participants pledged to promote the idea of solidarity among 
the nations of south-eastern Europe and to struggle “against the policy of 
conquest of European capitalism”. Furthermore, most of the socialists in 
the region opposed the military alliance of the Balkan nations against the 
Ottoman Empire (1912–13), arguing that it served the interests of the local 
bourgeoisies and dynasties and that an attempt to achieve national unity by 
dividing the peninsula would lead to more wars — as was borne out by the 
Second Balkan War, when the former allies fought among themselves over 
the division of Turkey’s European territories.17
The socialists’ inability to influence their governments’ choices be-
came even more obvious in 1914. Following the divisions within the Sec-
ond International, when the European socialists split into those who sup-
ported their country’s war effort and those who, headed by Lenin, opposed 
it and demanded that the war be turned into a class war, the socialist fac-
tions in the Balkans became divided into those who supported participa-
tion in the war and those who favoured neutrality. Both groups, however, 
remained loyal to the ideal of the Balkan federation. Thus in Greece, Pla-
ton Drakoulis, who supported Eleftherios Venizelos’s policy in favour of 
Greece’s joining the war on the side of the Entente, published in 1915 his 
proposal for a democratic Balkan federation — in which, in any case, the 
17 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 186–195; Živković and Plavšić, eds., Balkan Socialist 
Tradition, 123–129, 151–156. 
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federal Greek state would include all the territories that Greece was lay-
ing claim to. Drakoulis’s proposal was replied by the Bulgarian A. Shopov 
of the “broad” socialists (who supported their government’s military aims) 
with the counterproposal of a federation based on the Bulgarian national 
arguments.18 On the other side, the “narrow” Bulgarian socialists who, led 
by Dimitǔr Blagoev, were opposed to the war, called for “uncompromising 
class war” against the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and the monarchy and for the 
establishment of a Balkan federal republic as the only means of averting 
the horror of war. More or less the same position was taken by the pro-
neutrality Greek and Jewish socialists of the Federación, which maintained 
a strictly anti-war stance.19 
The local governments might not have made their choices on the ba-
sis of these declarations, but they did not ignore them either. Furthermore, 
after the October Revolution, the Balkan governments — like the rest of the 
European administrations — could not ignore the anti-war proclamations 
and the growing appeal of the left in the local communities. So, although in 
practice it remained an unattainable goal, the call for a Balkan federation, or 
at least for close cooperation among the nations on the peninsula, continued 
to be an active scenario for the reorganisation of the region and, possibly for 
the first time, resonated widely among those who had been disappointed 
with their governments’ hitherto expansionist policies. 
The federal idea between the Wars: Europe and the Balkans
Anyway, for most of the Balkan states, their process of national integration 
was almost complete and irredentism was no longer at the heart of their 
policy. So the preconditions existed for seeking ways to cooperate at a na-
tional level. At the same time, however, there was also the cleavage, which 
was seen in the rest of Europe and was fixed by the post-war peace treaties, 
between the “revisionist” states and those that preferred to maintain the 
status quo. Thus Bulgaria never concealed its desire to change the borders, 
while Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Turkey based their post-war for-
eign policies on consolidating the borders. There was also the question of 
minorities, something of a new problem for the Balkan nation-states, which 
18 P. Drakoulis, “Greece, the Balkans and the Federal Principle”, Asiatic Review (Oxford, 
February 1915); A. Schopoff, La Confédération balkanique et la Question macédonienne 
(Sofia 1915).
19 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 199–201; Živković and Plavšić, eds., Balkan Socialist 
Tradition, 226–232. For the Greek socialists’ stance during the War, see G. V. Leon-
taritis, Το ελληνικό σοσιαλιστικό κίνη�α κατά τον π�ώτο παγκόσ�ιο πόλε�ο [The Greek 
socialist movement in the First World War] (Athens 1978).
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inevitably determined relations between them.20 And then, there were refu-
gees — numerous in Greece and Bulgaria — who formed irredentist and 
nationalist pressure groups to influence their governments’ foreign policy 
(especially in the former case).21  
These issues proved crucial to the debate on the Balkan federation, 
but they were also an important consideration for the initiatives regarding 
European unification. Franco-German reconciliation was obviously a pre-
requisite for any European rapprochement, since relations between these 
two powers affected the security system of the entire continent. But it was 
not the only one: the east-European countries, like the Balkan countries, too, 
had to address not only the problems created in the relations between them 
by the minorities and the contesting of the borders, but also the revisionism 
of Hungary, Nazi Germany and the USSR; furthermore, all the European 
countries had to address the dilemma of transnational cooperation and the 
concomitant restriction of their national sovereignty — something which 
the new states of central and eastern Europe would not countenance.22
The Balkan countries initially seemed reluctant to address these is-
sues, either because they were not yet ready to renounce their traditional 
policies, or because they gave priority to their urgent political, social, and 
economic problems on the post-war domestic front, or because their inter-
est had shifted to other forms of cooperation, such as the Little Entente 
formed by Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia.23 In the same period 
the idea of a federal or a customs union burgeoned in the rest of Europe: 
from Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ‘Paneuropean’ movement in 1923 to Aristide 
Briand’s in 1929, there were many initiatives for economic and political 
unions at a European or regional level. At the same time the Depression 
reinforced the idea of a “common market”, which was considered more re-
alistic in west-European official circles. After a slight delay, this trend also 
20 L. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (London 2000), 593–615; B. Jelavich, History of 
the Balkans, vol. II: Twentieth Century (Cambridge and New York 1983), 134–136; S. K. 
Pavlovitch, A History of the Balkans, 1804–1945 (Essex and New York 1999), 230–231.
21 For the part played by the refugees in shaping Bulgarian foreign policy between the 
wars, see J. D. Bell, Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrar-
ian National Union, 1899–1923 (Princeton 1977), 184–204; A. Kalionski and V. Kolev, 
“�ι π�όσ�υγες στη Βουλγα�ία την εποχή του Μεσοπολέ�ου�� Π�οβλή�ατα έντα�ης�� [The 
refugees in Bulgaria between the Wars: Problems of integration], in Πρόσφυγες� στα 
Βαλκάνια. Μν��η και ενσω�άτωση [Refugees in the Balkans: Memory and integra-
tion], eds. B. K. Gounaris and I. D. Mihailidis (Athens 2004), 287–328.
22 Duroselle, L’Idée d’Europe, 270; J. Joll, Europe since 1870: An International History 
(London and New York 1976), 289–290; Stirk, European Integration, 25–29; Kokkinos, 
�ναζητώντας, 144–145.
23 Stavrianos, Balkans, 593–615; Jelavich, History, 143–180.
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reached south-eastern Europe; and it was no accident that Briand’s pro-
posal was supported by almost all Balkan capitals, at a time when most of 
the European governments seemed rather to disparage it.24  
The stage was set by the transnational agreements, which resolved 
at least some of the local disputes, most notably the friendship agreement 
between Greece and Turkey in 1930. Over the next five years a number of 
trade and cultural agreements were signed between the Balkan states, which 
considerably broadened relations between them. This climate of rapproche-
ment gave birth to the idea of the Balkan Conferences, which started at the 
initiative of the Greek republican statesman and former prime minister Al-
exandros Papanastasiou. The initiative was accepted by all six Balkan states, 
and they put together national delegations made up of MPs, diplomats, 
academics, and representatives of pacifist and professional organisations. At 
the first conference, in Athens in October 1930, it was decided to create a 
permanent organisation for the Balkan Conferences with the aim of pro-
moting Balkan cooperation in the political, economic, social, and cultural 
sectors, with Balkan unification as the stated ultimate aim. The instruments 
of the Conferences would be the general meeting, the council, the secre-
tariat and the national delegations. They in fact constituted a semi-official 
entity, for the resolutions of the Conferences had no binding effect on gov-
ernment policy. The role of the national delegations was to disseminate the 
idea of the unity of, and cooperation among, the Balkan peoples, and to 
press for the implementation of the conference resolutions. The organisa-
tion modelled itself on the League of Nations and Briand’s memorandum 
for the European federation.25 
The Balkan Conferences continued until 1934 and, despite the noted 
progress in a number of secondary, largely non-political issues, they showed 
that the countries involved were not yet in a position to find mutually ac-
ceptable solutions to the outstanding minority and border questions. At the 
meetings the national delegations reiterated the official views of their gov-
ernments, essentially confirming the divide between the supporters and the 
revisionists of the status quo in the region. The confirmation became official 
in 1934, when the countries which supported the status quo formed the Bal-
kan Entente, an official alliance with a far narrower range of aims than the 
Balkan Conferences and which included neither the revisionist Bulgaria nor 
the Italian-influenced Albania. In actuality it was a defensive alliance, fo-
cusing exclusively on countering the revisionist tendencies of Bulgaria. This 
24 Duroselle, L’Idée d’Europe, 272–81; Tchoubarian, European Idea, 122–32; Stirk, Eu-
ropean Integration, 26–29.
25 Kerner and Howard, Balkan Conferences, 21ff.; Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 224–
236; Stavrianos, Balkans, 736–738. Cf. Tounda-Fergadi, Mειονότητες, 41ff. 
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development was strongly criticised at the time by the visionaries of Balkan 
unity, as also by those who favoured the revision of the post-war borders 
in Europe, namely Germany and Italy; whereas the Entente was discreetly 
supported by Britain, France, and the USSR (which after 1933 aligned itself 
with the supporters of the status quo) as an initiative that might reinforce 
stability and peace in south-eastern Europe. The Entente was also criticised 
by later historians, because of the non-participation of Bulgaria and Albania 
and because of its anti-Bulgarian character. However, in view of the smaller 
countries’ incapacity to contend with the great powers’ aspirations in the re-
gion, the creation of a purely anti-revisionist alliance seems to have been the 
only way for the four participants to pursue an independent policy. At all 
events, it seems to have reflected the limits of intra-Balkan cooperation at 
the time. After all, the gradual domination of authoritarian regimes in most 
of the Balkan states, together with the general political and economic devel-
opments in Europe, which reinforced nationalist tendencies and a policy of 
autarky, hindered the efforts towards the political and economic unification 
of the peninsula.26 
For the rest of the 1930s the Balkan states managed to remain out-
side the crisis caused by Hitler’s rise to power and the subsequent explosion 
of revisionism in Europe — save for Albania, which was forcibly annexed 
by Italy in 1939. They could not avoid their economic subjugation to Nazi 
Germany, of course, which considerably boosted Hitler’s endeavour. But the 
responsibility for this was due more to Britain’s and France’s failure, first, to 
promote intra-European economic cooperation and, then, to successfully 
counter German economic and political influence in eastern Europe. This 
failure was also reflected in the western powers’ reluctance to support, of-
ficially and right from the start, the Balkan Entente, the members of which 
sustained their pro-western orientation in their foreign policy until France 
fell in June 1940; at this time, Italy entered the War and Romania was 
forced to cede much of its territory to the USSR, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 
which pushed Bucharest once and for all into the Axis.27 This was the end 
of the Balkan Entente, though not the end of the gestures of solidarity and 
26 Especially interesting for the history of the Balkan Conferences and the Balkan En-
tente are the contemporary studies by D. Alastos, The Balkans and Europe: A Study of 
Peace and the Forces of War (London 1937); T. I. Geshkoff, Balkan Union: A Road to Peace 
in Southeastern Europe (New York 1940); N. J. Padelford, Peace in the Balkans: The Move-
ment towards International Organization in the Balkans (New York 1935). See also Sta-
vrianos, Balkan Federation, 238–248. For a critique of Stavrianos’s views on the nature of 
the Balkan Entente, see Sebastian H. Lukasik, “The Balkan Entente: A Reassessment 
of an Aspect of Balkan Diplomacy in the Interwar Period”, Journal of Modern Hellenism 
15 (Winter 1998), 67–90.
27 Stavrianos, Balkans, 740–749; Stirk, European Integration, 42–44.
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cooperation among the Balkan nations, as became apparent in the years that 
followed.
The federal idea in the 1940s
During the early phase of the War’s expansion into south-eastern Europe 
only Greece was involved, after the Italian invasion in October 1940. Al-
though the Balkan Entente had essentially collapsed, both Yugoslavia and 
Turkey were quick to offer Greece indirect help, the former secretly supply-
ing munitions and the latter shifting troops to Thrace to avert any interven-
tion by Bulgaria. The following year, however, Greece and Yugoslavia failed 
to coordinate their forces against the German invasion, and as a result both 
countries were speedily overrun by Wehrmacht troops. For the next four 
years south-eastern Europe shared the same fate as the rest of the continent 
under Axis domination.28 
The Nazi conquest of Europe initially created expectations of a new 
European order that would replace the confusion of the national rivalries 
and economically unite the continent. These expectations were fostered both 
by high-ranking Nazis and German diplomats, who adopted a number of 
ambitious scenarios for reshaping the ‘New Europe’ under German leader-
ship, and by the Germans’ collaborators in the occupied West, who were 
hoping that their small countries would be more highly valued in the New 
Order. The reality was different, however: German occupation soon made 
it clear that Berlin’s policy was focused on looting and exploiting the Euro-
pean countries to serve Germany’s war needs. The Nazis’ European rhetoric 
was rekindled by the campaign against the USSR and the ‘crusade against 
Bolshevism’; but it never evolved into an integrated European programme, 
nor was it sufficiently convincing other than for the fanatical anti-Commu-
nist collaborators who were recruited into the SS.29
When the War began, Britain and France intended only to restore 
international law, but it soon became clear that this was not enough and 
that an alternative was required both to the Nazis’ New Order and to the 
interwar situation. It was in this context that the pro-federal trend devel-
oped, which flourished especially during the War and was articulated both 
by unofficial bodies and resistance organisations in occupied Europe and by 
28 J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934–1941 (London and New York 1962), 192–
225; Jelavich, History, 229–37. 
29 For this issue, see Smith and Stirk, eds., Making the New Europe. Cf. M. Burleigh, 
The Third Reich: A New History (London 2000), 422–432; Stirk, European Integration, 
52–58, 64–67; M. Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London and 
New York 1998), 144–155.
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the official allied nations. All the same, Winston Churchill did not want to 
make any official commitment regarding the post-war structure of Europe 
while the end of the War was not yet in sight, and also to avoid giving the 
United States –on which he was relying for the War to continue– the im-
pression that plans were being made that it might regard as antagonistic. To 
the contrary, he systematically encouraged federalist initiatives by the East 
European and Balkan governments in exile. In January 1942 the govern-
ments in exile of Poland and Czechoslovakia concluded an initial agree-
ment for a federal union between them, while the governments in exile of 
Greece and Yugoslavia signed a similar pact in the same month. These were, 
of course, meaningless declarations, for they presupposed that the occupied 
countries would be liberated and their exiled political leaders would return 
to power. The Polish–Czechoslovakian agreement soon collapsed, owing to 
the two sides’ differing attitudes to the USSR. The latter anyway would not 
accept federal structures that might restrict its influence in Eastern Europe. 
The Greek–Yugoslav agreement fared no better: from the start the Greek 
side seemed less keen to adopt it and when it eventually did so it was only 
at the urging of British diplomacy. Furthermore the two governments had 
very little influence in their occupied countries, not only because of the 
occupation, but also owing to the growth of the pro-communist national 
liberation fronts, which made it uncertain that they would return to power. 
Among the resistance organisations patriotism remained stronger than fed-
eralism at a Europe-wide level. And if some liberals and social democrats 
in the resistance in the West worked actively to promote the idea of Euro-
pean unity, in the East and the Balkans, where the pro-communist move-
ments predominated, the resistance movements were above all pursuing the 
national rehabilitation of their occupied or fragmented countries, which 
after all were suffering more from the German occupation and had been 
broken up because of it. Having adopted a patriotic rather than an inter-
nationalist discourse in order to gain wider popular support, and given the 
negative stance of the Soviet Union, the Balkan national liberation fronts of 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania insisted more on their national character, 
though they maintained contact with one another throughout the War.30 
With the end of the War things changed once more. The advance of 
the Red Army into Eastern Europe and the northern Balkans confirmed 
Soviet influence in the region. In Yugoslavia Tito’s ( Josip Broz’s) national 
liberation front prevailed totally over its opponents and felt strong enough 
both at home and abroad to pursue an ambitious initiative for Balkan uni-
fication. Tito’s initiative was based on Yugoslavia’s bilateral agreements with 
30 Stavrianos, Balkan Federation, 261–271; Tchoubarian, European Idea, 140–142; Stirk, 
European Integration, 58–70; Mazower, Dark Continent, 185–186, 202–206. 
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Albania and Bulgaria and seemed at first to have some prospect of being 
implemented: all three countries were now under ‘fraternal’ pro-communist 
regimes with ideologically similar manifestos and with the support of the 
USSR. In 1946 Yugoslavia and Albania concluded a treaty of friendship, co-
operation, and mutual assistance and also established jointly run financial 
enterprises to exploit Albania’s resources. The following year a similar agree-
ment was signed by Belgrade and Sofia and both sides agreed to collaborate 
closely on the Macedonian Question in the hope that the Greek commu-
nists would prevail and all the Macedonian territories would be united in 
the framework of a future local federation. However, these initiatives of 
Tito’s were not necessarily welcomed by the Albanian and the Bulgarian 
leadership, who were suspicious of the growing Yugoslav influence in their 
countries: Albania realised that Yugoslav ‘support’ was in fact replacing Ital-
ian ‘protection’; while Bulgaria, which was forced to accept Yugoslav cultural 
propaganda in the Pirin area, saw that the establishment of the autonomous 
Republic of Macedonia within the framework of the Yugoslav federation 
was turning the Macedonian Question against it. As long as Tito continued 
to enjoy the respect of Stalin and the Cominform, Sofia and Tirana could 
only follow Belgrade’s initiatives. But after the rift between Stalin and Tito 
in 1948, the two countries promptly severed their relations with Yugoslavia 
and rescinded the agreements they had signed with it. The last federalist 
movement in the Balkans was thus more or less nipped in the bud, owing to 
Moscow’s refusal to accept Belgrade’s independent actions and also because 
of Sofia’s and Tirana’s unwillingness to sacrifice their own independence for 
the sake of a federation centring on Belgrade.31 
Conclusion
Throughout the period under examination the idea of Balkan unity was in 
most cases a secondary consideration in the local countries’ diplomacy. The 
federalist proposals usually came from non-governmental representatives, 
more specifically from those who challenged not only their governments’ 
foreign policy but also those governments’ very legitimacy; for which reason 
the federalists in south-eastern Europe almost always belonged to oppo-
sition groups, initially among the radical democrats and then among the 
socialists. All the same, whenever the prevailing nationalist ideology was 
undergoing a crisis federalism seemed to appeal more strongly to popular 
opinion, while even the governments themselves appeared willing to follow 
the trend, at least insofar as they believed it served national interests. The 
31 Jelavich, History, 315–321; R. J. Crampton, The Balkans since the Second World War 
(London 2002), 27–31.
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idea of a united Europe followed a similar course in Europe as a whole. Un-
til the interwar period mainly intellectuals and theoreticians on the left ar-
ticulated it, but subsequently, under the dramatic impact of the First World 
War on the European communities, it seemed to attract the interest of of-
ficial diplomacy — but again temporarily. It took another global crisis, again 
centring on Europe, the long separation of the continent into two opposing 
camps, and the collapse of European hegemony at a global level to change 
the situation: the weakening of the west European great powers was the 
decisive factor that prompted them to take the initiative to form an, initially 
regional, economic union, which is now developing into a wager for wider 
European unity. The continent’s south-eastern extremity, of course, had nei-
ther the economic nor the political basis for such a venture. And this is why 
the only chance of accomplishing it is for the entire region to participate in 
European integration.
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